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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the financing decisions of regulated public
utilities. It is argued that the regulatory process affects utility fi-
nancing choices both by conditioning the environment in which these choices
are made and by creating opportunities for firms to influence the regulated
price through strategic financing behavior. The nature of this regulatory
effect continually changes, however, as economic conditions change and as
regulators, firms and consumers adapt to one another's decisions. The
direction of the impact on utility financing, therefore, may differ both
over time and across regulatory jurisdictions.
This theory of regulatory influence is tested by examining several
episodes in the financing experience of U.S. electric utilities from 1912 to
1979. Evidence of a regulatory effect on utility financing is found par-
ticularly for the early years of state commission regulation. Examples of
an adaptive response pattern on the part of regulators, firms and consumers
are also cited.
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The influence of regulation on public utilities' capital—labor choices
has been the subject of an extensive literature, beginning with the seminal
contribution of Averch and Johnson (1962) .Bycomparison, regulation's
influence on utility financing decisions has received relatively little
attention ,eventhough this latter issue is of interest from two
standpoints. First, from the standpoint of the microeconomic theory of public
policy, any regulation—induced departures from an optimal financing mix may
have welfare implications for utility customers and securityholders and for
the economy at large. These implications have been alluded to in policy
debates,2 but have been the subject of little formal theoretical analysis.3
Second, from the standpoint of corporate finance theory, regulation may have
important effects on the capital market "frictions" that are thought to
determine an optimal capital structure.4 Both the tax considerations and
incentive problems that influence the debt—equity mix may be perceived
differently by firms subject to regulation than by those that are not.5
The purpose of this paper is to present a theory and empirical tests of
the influence of regulation on utility financing decisions. In Section I, a
theory is developed incorporating the motivations of regulators, consumers and
the firm's securityholders, and it is shown that regulation can affect a
utility's financing mix in a variety of ways, depending on specific
assumptions about the regulators' behavior and the economic environment. In
particular, firms may be induced to use greater proportions of either equity—2—
or debt financing, depending on how hard—pressed economically are firms and
consumers and on whether regulators behave in a naive or sophisticated
fashion.
In Section II, selected episodes in the financing experience of U.S.
electric utilities from 1912 to 1979 are analyzed. This lengthy time period
encompasses a broad range of economic environments as well as the evolutionary
development of regulation by state commissions, and it thus allows testing for
different types of regulatory Influences on utility capital structures. In
the early years of state regulatory commIssIons, for example, it is found that
firms may have been induced to use greater amounts of debt and preferred stock
financing than they otherwise would have, in an attempt to Influence the
output prices set by the commissions. In the period from World War II to
about 1970, on the other hand, It is argued that regulation probably had a
more passive influence on utility financing, and in the economically—pinched
decade of the 1970's, regulation may have induced some firms to use more
equity financing.
I. Regulation and Utility Financing: Theory
A. Participants in the Regulatory Process and their Motivations
The first step in analyzing regulation's influence on utility
financing is to develop a model of the motivations and decisions of the
various actors in the regulatory process. The set of actors in this model
consists of three groups: the regulated firm and its securityholders,
consumers of the firm's output, and the regulatory commissioners.
The firm produces output, in each period, t, and sells this output to
consumersata price, P, that is set by the regulators in each period. The
priceisdetermined by the regulatory "climate," Rt, which will be explained—3—
in greater detail below. Price in turn determines consumers' demand, and it
is assumed that the firm is obligated to produce enough output to satisfy
whatever demand occurs in each period.
A possible representation of the productibn process is that the firm
chooses a capital stock, K, at the beginning of the period (i.e. at time t—l)
and a means for financing this capital stock. For the time being, we will
confine possible financing sources to debt, D, and equity, E, so for a given
capital stock the financing decision is fully specified by choosing a value of
D6. Once the capital stock and financing decisions have been made at the
beginning of the period, uncertainty is resolved, and the firm must employ a
variable input (fuel, say, or labor, or some fixed—proportion combination
thereof) in the amount necessary to satisfy demand.7
The one other decision variable that the firm has under its control is
the amount of lobbying pressure it exerts on the regulators in an attempt
to win a more favorable output price. As will be seen below, the regulatory
climate, Rt, depends on the firms's lobbying effort, 1ftLobbying effort is
assumed to be costly, however, so 1ft also affects annual expenses.
The firm's annual operating expense, °t, which is taken to include the
cost of both the variable input and the firm's lobbying effort, depends on the
quantity of output to be produced, the amount of lobbying effort, the capital
stock and the financing mix at time t—i, as given by Dt_l. The latter
variable is included because such costs as negotiating with fuel suppliers may
be affected by whether or not previous financing choices have put the firm in
financial difficulty.
The firm may also wish to invest at time t so as to augment the capital
stock available for next period's production. That is,—4—
= +It, (1)
where 1 is investment at time t. is in turn determined by the firm's
expected cash flows, C,as well as its mix of previously—issued
securities, Dt_i. The financing mix is included to reflect the idea,
suggested by Myers (1977), that a firm's outstanding long—term debt may affect
its willingness to undertake profitable investment projects.
Putting together these several pieces, the firm's after—tax operating




where T is the corporate tax rate.
In keeping with standard corporate finance theory, the firm is assumed to
make its decisions so as to maximize the total market value, V, of its
securities.8 V Is in turn taken to depend on the firm's projected operating
cash flows, as well as its financing mix. At time o, then, the firm chooses
10 and In addition, perhaps,to a contingent plan for future investment,
financing and lobbying efforts, so as to maximize V0, where
V0 =V(,D), (3)
and where = ...., )isthe vector of operating cash
flows and D =(D0,D1, ...,Dt,....)isthe financing mix In each period.9
The second group of actors in the model is consumers, who simply purchase
the amount they desire of the firm's output at the price set by the regulatory
commission. They do not necessarily accept the regulators' pricing decisions—5—
passively, however, but just as the firm does, may choose to exert lobbying
presures, 1ct' in each period. Both the amount of output purchased and the
expense devoted to lobbying effort are assumed to be chosen by consumers so as
to maximize utility.
The third group of actors is the regulatory commissioners who are charged
with setting a price for the firm's output. The regulators are assumed to set
this price so as to balance the conflicting interests of the firm and its
customers, and thus their objective may he viewed formally as maximizing a
weighted sum of consumers' and producer's surplus. It is further assumed,
however, that the regulators have no precise algorithm for computing such
surpluses, but rather that they are continually groping for a solution in a
world of uncertainty and imperfect information.
The regulators may be aided by broad judicial guidelines, such as
providing a "fair" return to capital, but the implementation of such
guidelines is assumed to depend on the actual investment and financing
decisions of the firm (and on how these are measured), as well as on the
relative strength of the lobbying efforts by the firm and consumers. As in
Joskow (1974), the commissioners may use the level of criticism and pressure
from these two constituent groups as a guide to how well they are serving
their judicial mandate. Prices may be altered in response to pressures from
both sides in such a way as to minimize the total volume of criticism.10 In
addition ,asin Owen and Braeutigam (1978), the firm may try to further
influence the price—setting process by making its investment and financing
decisions, and by governing the flow of information to the regulators about
these decisions, in a strategic manner.11 The firm presumably has superior
information about its own economic condition, and it may be able to use this
advantage to alter the regulator's perception of the fair price or rate of—6—
return.
In summary, then, the price that is set depends on the regulatory
climate, Rt, in each period, and that climate Is In turn conditioned by the
firm's investment and financing decisions, and by lobbying pressure from both
the firm and consumers. That Is,
R. =Rt(Ktl,Dtl,lft,lt). (4)
The ultimate effect of the arguments of Rt on the regulated price will
vary with the sophistication of regulators and consumers, the regulators'
weighting of firm and consumer interests, the economic environment and the
costs of lobbying effort. If regulators and consumers are naive about the
firm's operations, for example, the firm may be able to manipulate its
decisions so as to induce the regulator to set the monopoly price, without, at
the same time, arousing a countervailing lobbying effort by consumers. If the
commission is sophisticated and heavily slanted toward consumer Interests, on
the other hand, such manipulation may be of little use to the firm. Moreover,
the desire of both the firm and consumers to seek regulatory relief through
lobbying effort maydependon the stringency of the overall economic
environment, as well as on the costs of such efforts.12
B. How the Regulatory Environment CanInfluenceUtility Financing
Decisions
With the motivations of these three groups in mind, we can now
turn to an examination of the factors affecting utility financing.13 The
optimal financing mix, for a given capital stock is that which maximizes the
firm's total market value. For simplicity, attention will be confined to the—7—
financing decision made at t0, and any effects on future financing decisions
will be ignored. Substituting (4) into (2), (2) into (3), and totally
differentiating (3) with respect to D0, holding I( and i constant, gives the
first—order condition for the optimal financing mix:'4
dV 3V 3V 3V dl
o o odC o3C,3R 3Rc\ (5)
dD 3D 3C dD 3C 3R3D 31 dD /
o o o o c 0
Thefirst two terms in expression (5) represent factors that would affect
a firm's financing decision even in the absence of regulation. The partial
derivative, 3V/3D, for example, represents ways in which the firm's capital
structure affects its total market value, independent of the stream of
operating cash flows. These might include the tax saving from debt or
additions to value stemming from signalling aspects of the firm's capital
structure.15 The second term in (5) represents any direct effects that the
firm's financing decision might have on its future operating cash flows.
Increased use of debt, for instance, may increase the chance that financial
distress will interfere with the firm's operations in some future states of
nature. Likewise, agency costs associated with the firm's external financing
may manifest themselves in the form of lower operating cash flows in the
future 16
The third term in expression (5) represents ways in which the firm's
financing decision may indirectly affect the cash flow stream by first
influencing the regulatory climate. If the financing decision affects the
regulatory climate, this may in turn affect the sequence of output prices set
by the commission and hence the operating cash flows.
The first component of this term, (3V/3C)(3C/3R)(DR/3D0), is the direct—8—
effect of the firm's capital structure on the prices set by the regulators.
This "price—influence effect," which has been analyzed in detail by Taggart
(1981) is active primarily when regulators follow a mechanical pricing rule
that depends on the firm's financing mix. One example of such a rule occurs
when the regulator sets price so as to yield an allowed revenue based on
allowed rates of return to the various sources of capital. If the allowed
rate of retirn to equity is e, the imbedded interest cost on the firm's
oustanding debt is i, and the regulators know the firm's demand and operating
costs, the price in a given period tmightbe set so that
—O)(l—T)
=1(l—T)Dt+ eEt. (6)
But if the allowed returns i and e are invariant to the firm's capital
structure, as has been asserted to be the case,17 and if e > i(l—T),(6)
clearly indicates that the firm can win a higher price by substituting equity
for debt.18
An alternative price—influence opportunity might present itself if the
firm feels that the regulators are worried about the possibility of financial
distress. If it Is felt that the regulators set price so as to allow the firm
to maintain a particular fixed charge coverage ratio, for instance, the firm
may find it worthwhile to Issue more debt now than It otherwise would, thereby
increasing the probability that this coverage ratio will not be maintained at
the current price and thus increasing the chance for a higher output price in
at least some future states of nature.19—9—
The remaining term in expression (5) representsways in which the firm's
financing decision might alter consumer lobbying efforts. If the firm's
attempts to influence price are successful, this may induce additional lobby-
ing efforts by consumers, perhaps with some lag.2
When expression (5) is considered as a whole, thereappear to be two
general ways in which regulation can influence utility financing decisions.
First, as has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the firm's knowledge
that its financing choice can affect the regulatory climate, andpotentially
the output price, may induce it to choose a different capital structure than
it would have in the absence of regulation. To the extent that there isa
socially optimal capital structure, this may in turn entail welfare costs. If
there are real resource costs associated with financial distress, forexample,
and if the firm deliberately courts financial distress through additional debt
issuance, in an attempt to induce the regulators to raise the output price,
there is a cost imposed on society.21
Second, the regulatory environment may affect thosefactors that would
ordinarily determine the financing decision and may thus cause a regulated
firm to choose a different capital structure from that of an otherwise
equivalent unregulated firm. A case in point might be the stability of the
firm's operating cash flow stream. If regulation produces a more stable
environment, and if the firm's proportion of debt financing depends on the—10—
perceived stability of future cash flows, the regulated firm may use more debt
than would an unregulated one.22 Another example is agency costs associated
with external financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, for instance,
that regulation constrains managers from undertaking excessively risky
projects or otherwise undermining the bondholders' position and that regulated
firms are thus able to make greater use of debt financing.
At a deeper level, however, these two routes by which regulation can
affect utility financing decisions stem from the same source. Whether by
design or not, regulation serves as a means for transferring wealth and risks
between the firm's owners and its customers. With the regulatory commission
acting as mediator, each group vies with the other to ensure that the outcome
of this transfer process will be favorable to itself. The firm's financing
decision in a regulated environment both reflects the outcome of this process
and at the same time influences that outcome.
The firm's capital structure is itself a means for wealth— and risk—
shifting. In an unregulated environment, such shifting typically occurs among
different classes of securityholders, but under regulation the firm's
customers are also involved in the process. The customers have an implicit
claim on the firm in the sense that if the regulator succeeds in lowering
price below the monopoly level, wealth will be shifted from the firm to the
customers. The firm then has the same kind of incentives to recapture some of
this wealth by undermining the customers' position that shareholders might
have to undermine the bondholders' position. The possibility that the firm
can gain a higher price by issuing enough debt to court financial distress—11—
represents an attempt by the firm to shift risk to its customers. Thus the
firm's financing decision is part of a broader set of wealth—and risk—shifting
activities that occur under regulation. At the same time, if regulation makes
the cash flow stream more stable, thus allowing the firm to issue more debt,
then the financing decision is also reflecting the effects of these shifting
activites.
The basic results of this section may be summarized in terms of the
model's implications for empirical observations. The primary implication is
that the regulatory process should have an identifiable effect on utility
financing decisions. This effect may stem from the firm's attempt to
influence the regulated price through its capital structure choice or from
regulation's impact on the economic environment in which the firm operates.
A second implication is that the direction of this effect will vary with
both economic conditions and the behavior of the different regulatory
commissions. It was seen above, for example, that the firm's attempts to
influence price may lead to greater proportions of either debt or equity
financing, depending on the details of the price—setting rule used by the
regulators. Furthermore, regulation's effect on the firm's economic
environment may vary, depending on the pressures to which the regulators have
been subjected by both the firm and its customers.
Finally, the discussion of the regulators' behavior in Section l.A.
suggests that the relationship between regulation and utility financing should
not be immutable, but rather a process of adaptive response. If the firm is
successful in influencing price through a particular financing strategy, this
should reduce the welfare of consumers who will in turn exert offsetting
lobbying pressure on the regulatory commission. An initially successful
financing strategy may eventually be blocked, then, as the regulators adopt—12—
different price—setting rules or otherwise change their behavior. We might
expect that financing strategies aimed at influencing price would be most
successful either during the early development of regulation or immediately
following the adoption of new price—setting rules, before the regulators have
had a chance to develop countervailing strategies. Furthermore, the firm's
desire to try to influence the price and the regulators' susceptibility to
such influence should depend on the economic pressures to which both the firm
and consumers are subject.
II. Regulation and Electric Utility Financing in the U.S: Empirical Evidence
A. Secular Patterns in Electric Utility Finance
A rough indication of long—term trends in U.S. electric utility
finance is given by the capitalization ratio plots in Figures 1 and 2. Figure
1 traces the ratios of long—term debt, D, common equity, Ec and preferred
stock, E to total capitalization, TC, for electric utilities.23 In Figure 2,
the long—term debt ratio for electric utilities is compared with that for U.S.
corporations as a whole.
In broad outline, four major eras in utility financing appear to be
distinguishable. In the first two decades of the century, utilities increased
their debt and preferred stock proportions rather dramatically, at the expense
of common equity financing. Beginning in the 1920's and carrying through World
War II, this trend was generally reversed, with the debt ratio in particular
declining. The debt ratio then entered a period of increase from roughly the
end of World War II to 1970. Most of this increase seems to have come at the
expense of preferred stock, with the common equity series exhibiting no
pronounced trend. Finally, begining around 1970, the utility debt ratio has
declined almost without interruption while the common equity and preferred—13—
stock ratios have tended to increase.
During some periods the financing experience of electric utilities has
paralleled that of U.S. corporations as a whole, but in others it has not. As
shown in FIgure 2, for example, the decline in debt financing during World War
II and the steady increase thereafter until 1970 occur both for utilities and
the corporate sector generally. The decline in debt financing by utilities
since 1970, however, seems atypical of the corporate sector as a whole. There
is also fragmentary evidence, not shown in Figure 2, that long—term debt
financing by the corporate sector as a whole declined between 1913 and 1922,
at the same time that utility debt financing increased dramatically.24
In the ensuing paragraphs, the ability of the theory developed in Section
I to illuminate these trends is investigated. In particular, the periods
1912—'22 and 1970—'79, in which utility financing patterns diverge from those
of the corporate sector generally, are examined in detail.
B. Utility Finance in the Early Years of State Regulation
The earliest electric utility companies in the U.S. were regulated
by municipalities through the granting of special franchises to use the public
streets.25 Although Massachusetts established state regulation of gas
utilities in 1885, the era of state regulatory commissions is generally
acknowledged to have begun in 1907 with the establishment of such commissions
in New York and Wisconsin. Many other states followed suit almost
immediately, with twenty—seven such commissions being established between 1907
and 1914, and this movement continued, though at a slower pace, after 1914.
The theory in Secton I suggests that any effects regulation may have on
utility financing are intimately associated with the price—setting process.
Since formal price regulation began only with the establishment of state—14—
commissions, then, the years immediately following 1907 provide an
experimental setting for testing the theory. In particular, the theory
predicts that the financing decisions of those utilities regulated by state
commissions should differ from those of utilities that are not so regulated.
Without further specification of the regulatory environment, however, the
theory does not predict the direction of these differences.
The first step in testing for regulatory effects is to specify an
equation describing utility financing decisions in the absence of price
regulation. This equation is formulated in terms of period— by— period changes
in the firm's long—term debt, or
AD = A + D (7)
t 1 t 2t—l'
where Dt and are the changes in the firm's long—term debt and total
assets, respectively, occurring between time t—l and time t.Dt_i is the
level of the firm's long—term debt at time t—l. Equation (7) reflects the
idea that the firm wishes to finance some target proportion of its additional
assets in each period with long—term debt.26 Adjustment to this target is
tempered, however, by the beginning—of—period level of long—term debt, which
may have been above or below target.
Equation (7) may be estimated using data from the Census of Electrical
Industries. Financial data covering the early period of state regulation are
available for the years 1912, 1917 and 1922 and these are reported on a
statewide basis. A simple test for regulatory effects, then, entails the
inclusion of dummy variables indicating whether or not the utilities in a
given state were subject to state commission regulation during the period in
question. Three such dummy variables are used: R12 takes on a value of unity—15—
if the state had a commission by 1912 and zero otherwise; R17 takes on a value
of unity if a state commission was established between 1912 and 1917 and zero
otherwise; R22 takes on a value of unity if a state commission was
established between 1917 and 1922 and zero otherwise.27 Although the theory
by itself does not predict the signs of the coefficients of these dummy
variables, anecdotal evidence from the period suggests that regulated
utilities at this time may have emphasized securities with fixed charges (debt
and preferred stock) in an attempt to win higher prices from the commissions.
Excessive capitalizations, involving security issues far in excess of the
reproduction cost of the assets were thought to be prevalent in this era.28
Such capitalizations could be viable only if commissions granted high enough
prices to support them. Firms may thus have increased their debt and
preferred stock proportions in order to present the commissions with heavy
schedules of fixed charges that would drive the utilities into bankruptcy if
high enough prices were not granted. To test for this possibility, preferred
stock is added to long—term debt in estmating equation (7), and the estimated
regulatory dummy coefficients are examined for positive signs.
Given the available data, equation (7), with the three regulatory dummy
variables included, could be estimated for the periods 1912 —'17and 1917—
'22. The results yielded only one significantly positive coefficient for the
regulatory variables, that of R22 in the perod 1917 —'22.This is consistent
with the notion that firms in states that formed regulatory commissions during
that period may have biased their capital structures toward debt and preferrd
stock in an attempt to win higher prices. Nevertheless, only five states
formed commissions between 1917 and 1922, and thus this finding does not
constitute overwhelming support for the presence of regulatory effects on
utility financing decisions.—16—
When viewed in the light of Jarrell's (1978) results, however, the
evidence may be stronger than it appears at first glance. Jarrell examined
this same period and looked for evidence that the formation of state
commissions resulted in significantly higher prices for firms in those
states. He found no evidence that firms subject to state regulation enjoyed
higher prices than firms with no state commission in 1912, 1917 or 1922. In
fact, he found that prices of utility services were significantly lower in
1912 in those states that formed commissions by 1917 than in states that did
not. By 1917, prices in the regulated states were still no higher than those
in the unregulated states but the gap had been significantly narrowed.
Jarrell interpreted these results as evidence that the demand by firms for
state regulation was heaviest in those states where firms faced the stiffest
competitive pressure prior to regulation. During the era of municipal
franchising, it was common for cities to award competitive franchises, and in
areas where competition was most effective, we would expect to observe lower
prices, on the average, prior to regulation. If the establishment of state
commissions was primarily for the benefit of firms, we would then expect to
see prices in these states rising toward the levels of other states as
regulation is instituted, and Jarrell argues that his results are consistent
with this expectation.
A similar interpretation might be applied to utility financing during
this period. If the amount of debt and preferred stock that a firm wishes to
issue depends positively on both the level and stability of its cash flow
stream, then a fiercely competitive environment would be less conducive to
debt and preferred stock financing.If indeed those states that formed
regulatory commissions early were ones in which utility competition was
heaviest to begin with, we would expect firms in these states to start Out—17—
using lower proportions of debt and preferred stock financing. These
proportions might then rise after commissions are formed, both as regulation
breeds a more stable environment and as firms try to influence the commissions
to grant them higher prices.
The most convenient way to check the consistency of the results here with
this interpretation is to estimate equation (7) for the periods 1912 —'17and
1917 —'22together. Slope dummy variables can then be added to allow for
changes in the coefficients, and the coefficients can be tested for
significant changes between the two periods. The results of this estimation
are reported in Table 1. A constant term has been added to equation (7) to
allow for possible nonlinearities, and the variables other than the regulatory
dummy variables have been deflated by lagged assets to correct for
heteroscedasticity.
The estimated equation fits the data well, and, as might be expected, the
explanatory variable that does the most work is the percentage change in
assets. The coefficient of Dt_1/A_i, which was expected to be negative, is
positive but not significantly so. The coefficients of primary interest are
those of the regulatory dummy variables. All of these are negative (although
the coefficient of R12 is not significantly negative), for the period 1912—
'17, suggesting that utilities in states that established regulation the
earliest initially employed lower proportions of debt and preferred stock
financing. In the subsequent period, 1917— '22, however, there are strong
indications that the coefficients of the regulatory dummy variables moved in a
positive direction.
This evidence is consistent, then, with the notion that state regulation
produced an environment more conducive to debt and preferred stock financing
by electric utilities. The question that remains is whether the greater use—18—
of these financing sources is attributable to regulation's having produced a
more stable environment or to the firms' attempts to influence regulated
prices. The behavior of utilities in those states that established regulations
between 1912 and 1917 suggests that the environmental effect may have been
more important. This is because greater use' of debt and preferred stock
financing followed the establishment of regulation only with a considerable
lag, and be.ause there is no evidence of any positive relation between prices
in these states and the change in firms' financing patterns. Jarrell (1978)
found, for example, that prices in those states establishing regulation between
1912 and 1917 rose most by 1917 and that part of these gains were lost by
1922. Thus the major impact of regulation on prices seems to have occurred
before the impact on financing decisions, and a plausible inference is that
utilities altered their financing patterns only after they saw how state
regulation was affecting their environment.
For utilities in states that established regulation between 1917 and
1922, however, the evidence does not rule Out a price—influence effect on
financing decisions. First, the change in financing patterns in these states
coincided with the establishment of regulation, and second, Jarrell's evidence
indicates that price increases in these states occurred between 1917 and
1922. Since the effect of regulation on utility financing depends crucially
on the behavior of individual state commissions, of course, it is not
surprising that these effects may not be uniform across states and that
different types of effects may have been at work in states regulated in
different years.—19--
C. Adaptive Responses by the Regulatory Commissions toUtility Financing
Strategies
If it is accepted that at least some utilities were indeed
successful in winning higher prices through the use of debt andpreferred
stock financing, the theory ifl Section i predicts that suchsuccess would be
followed by an adaptive regulatory response. The success of suchfinancing
strategies would be detrimental to consumers who woUld presumablyput more
pressure on regulators to take counteracting measures.29 Furthermore, these
consumer pressures should be stronger as consumers are more economically hard
pressed.
In fact, after growing complaints about utility financialmanipulations
in the l920's, state regulatory commissions began paying muchmore attention
to utility financing in the early l930's. Although most of the statutes
establishing state regulation in the first place gave the commissions the
power to review all utility securities issues, it is alleged that control over
financial policy was initially quite lax.3° In the wake of thefinancial
difficulties experienced during the Depression, however,many commissions
apparently began to take a far more active interest in financial regulation.
A 1931 revision of the Wisconsin public utility law, forexample, empowered
the state commission to keep "all classes of capital securities inreasonable
relationships to each other" and even to halt the payment of common stock
dividends if these would impair the utility's financial integrity.31In
several other states, moreover, it became common to examine bond indentures
closely and to "control the issuance of additional bonds under eachmortgage,—20—
require sinking funds for most bond issues, specify provisions for
depreciation and maintenance costs and limit the payments of common stock
dividends.
..32
The striking similarity between these statutory measures and the kinds of
covenants customarily written into bond indentures, suggests that regulatory
commissions became increasingly aware that utilities could follow financing
strategies detrimental to consumers.33 The utilities could try to shift
wealth from consumers to themselves through exactly the same strategies that
an ordinary firm might use to undermine existing bondholders' positions and
thus shift wealth from bondholders to shareholders. As the theory suggests,
however, attempts by firms to use these strategies were apparently met by
countervailing measures on the part of legislators and regulators.
D. Utility Financing From World War II to 1970
As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, a period of rising utility debt ratios
occurred from roughly the end of World War II to about 1970. Moreover, this
trend seems to parallel the financing behavior of U.S. corporations generally
over the same period.
Two, possibly complementary, interpretations of this trend are consistent
with the model developed in Section I.Both interpretations revolve around
changes in the economic environment which took place during this period,
creating an atmosphere more conducive to corporate debt. These changes
include dramatic increases in corporate tax rates, which enhanced the tax
advantage to debt, as well as perceptions that the economy was becoming more
stable as memories of the Depression grew dimmer.34
The first interpretation is based on a change in regulatory attitudes.
It has been argued that in the wake of the Hope Natural Gas decision of 1944,—21—
regulatory commissions placed greater emphasis on the cost of capital and
became increasingly aware of the possibilities of debt financing for reducing
this cost.35 Regulators may thus have begun pressuring utilities to make
greater use of debt financing so that the tax savings could be passed on to
cons uiners.36 One way in which commissions applied such pressure was by
setting prices on the basis of a hypothetical capital structure, containing a
larger debt proportion than the utility actually possessed. But if the
regulated price is independent of the capital structure actually chosen by the
utility, all terms in equation (5) by which the financing choice,D, affects
the regulatory environment, R, vanish, and the utility's financing decision
will be dictated by the same considerations affecting that of an unregulated
firm. Thus, the same changes in tax rates and perceived stability of the
economic environment that induced corporations generally to issue more debt
may have had similar effects on utility financing.
The second interpretation is based on Joskow's (1974) argument that
regulatory constraints may not have been binding during a significant portion
of this period, particularly throughout much of the 1960's. With only minor
interruptions, the trend in electric utility costs was downward from 1949 to
about l968. If Joskow is correct in asserting that consumers are likely to
complain only about prices that are rising in nominal terms, failing costs and
stable, or slightly declining, prices may have allowed utilities to reach
positions during this period close to what they could have achieved in the
absence of regulation. Thus utilities may have had little incentive to gear
their financing decisions toward influencing prices. In the absence of such
incentives, utility financing decisions would then have been based on the same
considerations affecting those of corporations generally.—22—
E. Utility Financing in the 1970's
As has been pointed Out in Figure 1, the long trend toward increased
utility debt was reversed around 1970, and electric utilities began to make
greater use of common equity and preferred stock financing. The 1970's were
also inflationary years in which utilities could no longer be content with
stable prices, but in which requests for price increases were met with
increasing consumer resistance. Regulators thus faced growing pressure from
both sides of the market, and regulatory activity, as measured by the number
of rate cases, increased dramatically.
In such an environment, utilities would be expected to seek higher prices
through such means as lobbying with regulators and using price—influence
financing strategies. At the same time, however, consumers would be sensitive
to such strategies and could be expected to mount countervailing pressures
against the regulators. We might expect these strategies to be successful,
then, only in jurisdictions where regulators were more favorably inclined to
utility interests. Furthermore, the kinds of strategies employed might be
those that are least likely to arouse consumer resistance.
One such strategy might be the one described in Section I.B., in which
allowed returns to debt common equity and preferred stock are invariant to
capital structure proportions, so that the firm can gain higher prices by
substituting common pity and preferred stock for debt. Regulators
sympathetic to the plight of the utilities might be inclined to go along with
this strategy, even if they were aware that required returns fluctuate with
capital structure proportions, because it would allow them to grant the
utilities higher prices without increasing the allowed returns to the
different sources of funds. Keeping the allowed returns the same might then—23—
blunt consumer resistance to these price increases.
If this strategy was indeed being used, we would expect to find firms in
those states whose regulators were more favorably inclined toward the
utilities using less debt during the 1970's than firms in other states. An
obvious difficulty in testing this proposition, of course, Is to identify the
states whose commissions behaved favorably toward the utilities. This was done
using a composite of five investment firms' rankings of state regulatory
climates, which classified states as "very favorable," "favorable" or
"unfavorable," as of 1978.38
Equation (7) was then estimated with three dummy variables (V,F and U)
added to reflect the three categories of states. If the financing strategy
described above was indeed In use, the coefficient of at least the "V' dummy
variable should be significantly negative, indicating less use of debt by
utilities In very favorable states for at least some period during the
1970's.39
The equation was estimated for three periods, 1965—'70, 1970—'75 and
1975—'79. In contrast to the earlier period, described in Section II.B., data
were available for individual firms in every state from Statistics of
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States. Data for each of the
three periods were available for a total of 164 firms, and the dummy variables
were keyed to the states in which the individual firms did the predominant
portion of their business.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 2. The coefficients of
the percentage change in assets decline steadily over the three periods,
indicating that target levels were declining for utilities generally. In
addition, the coefficient of the lagged debt—assets ratio becomes
significantly negative in the 1975—'79 period. Together, these coefficients—24—
suggest that the electric utility industry in general underwent a period of
financial retrenchment as the economic environment became more stringent.40
Taken individually, none of the coefficients of the regulatory, dummy
variables is significantly different from zero, and thus there is no strong
evidence that the price— influence financing strategy described above was
widely followed. The coefficient of the dummy variable for "very favorable"
states does, however, change from positive to negative between the 1970—'75
and 1975—'79 periods, the only such coefficient to do so.41 Moreover, the
regulatory dummy variables taken as a group, while not significantly different
from zero for the l965—'70 or 1970—'75 periods, do become significant for the
1975—'79 period.42 By the latter half of the 1970's, therefore, something
about the various regulatory environments had changed so that this particular
classification scheme took on some power to explain utility financing
behavior.
Taken as a whole, then, this evidence is at least weakly consistent with
the notion that utility financing decisions were influenced by regulation as
the economic environment became more stringent. In addition, although
financial retrenchment in the face of increased economic instabilityappears
to be the major cause of the decline in debt financing, some firms in the
"very favorable" states may have altered their financing strategies in an
attempt to influence price.43
There is a variety of reasons that may explain why the evidence reported
above is not stronger. One of these is that regulatory commissionsmay indeed
adjust allowed returns for capital structure changes so that the hypothesized
financing strategy would not be effective.44 In many states, in fact,
consumer sensitivity to price increases may have forced the cannissions to make
such adjustments. In addition, the state classification scheme used abovemay—25—
not be accurate or constant over time, and even if it is, not all firms in a
given state may be in a position to employ similar financing strategies.
Nevertheless, the evidence does give some suggestion of regulatory influence
on tktility financing decisions, and hence the precise nature of this influence
may bear further investigation.
III. Conclusion
The primary argument of this paper has been that regulation
influences utility financing decisions both by conditioning the economic
environment in which these decisions are made and by giving firms
opportunities to engage in strategic financing behavior. The channels through
which this influence occurs, however, are continually changing as a result of
a pattern of adaptive responses by firms, regulators and consumers. The
direction of the influence on utility financing, therefore, may differ both
over time and across regulatory jurisdictions.
Although the changing nature of the process makes this regulatory
influence difficult to isolate at times, it does leave its traces in the data,
and a review of the trends in utility financing yields illustrations of the
pattern of adaptive response. While the bulk of scholarly attention has been
devoted to regulation's influence on the firm's real input decisions, then,
both theory and evidence suggest that the financing decision is an integral





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates of Equation (7), With Regulatory Dummy
Variables, for Periods 1912—'17 and 1917—'22 Combined
Independent Estimated Standard
Variable Coefficient Error Statistic
Constant —.101 .113 —0.89




At At_i —.011 .040 —0.27
A xDUN
t_l
Dt_i/At_i .270 .202 1.33
(Dt_i/At_i)x DUN .243 .276 0.88
R12 —.050 .060 —0.83
(R12) x DUN .144 .085 1.68
R17 —.094 .043 —2.20
R17 x DUN .150 .062 2.43
R22 —.127 .070 —1.80
R22xDUN .287 .095 3.03
DUN=1for observations from 1917 —'22,0 otherwise
R2 =.950
S.E. =.119
Number of observations92Table 2
Estimates of Equation (7), with Ieguiatory Dummy
Variables for Periods 1965—'70, 1970—'75, 1975—'79
Independent Variables
AtAt_l Dti
Constant At_i At_i V F U
i965—'70
Estimated Coefficient—.032 .552 .045 —.026—.007—.018






Estimated Coefficient—.056.475— .032 .008.007.031






Estimated Coefficient.080.437 —.336 —.027.023 .018




All equations have 164 observations.Footnotes
1. See Bailey (1973) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
2.See, for example, Weidenbaum (1975).
3. Oneexceptionis Litzenberger and Sosin (1979). This paper will be
discussed in more detail below.
4. In the absence of such frictions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) and others
have shown that the firm's financing choice has no effect on its optimal
investment decisions or on its total market value.
5.Analyses along these lines have previously been applied to regulated
financial institutions. Scott and Mayer (1971), Merton (1977) and Buser,
Chen and Kane (1981), for example, discuss the incentive problems
associated with deposit insurance and their effect on commercial bank
financing decisions. Joskow (1973) describes the way price regulation in
the property and liability insurance industry can alter firms' incentive
to provide capital backing behind their policies. In the public
utilities field, discussion has largely centered on the firm's perception
of the tax benefits to debt in the presence of regulation. See Gordon
(1967), Elton and Cruber (1971), Gordon and McCallum (1972) and
Litzenberger and Sosin (1979).
6. That is, Kt_1 =Dt_1 + Et...1, where Et_1 and Dt_i are stated at book value
(or original cost of the capital stock). For simplicity, such factors asdepreciation and inflation will be ignored here, so there is no
divergence between book value and reproduction cost.
7.Uncertainty may enter in a variety of ways. Demand may be uncertain at
the time the firm chooses Its capital stock ,forexample, in which case
the amount of the variable input necessary to meet demand is uncertain as
of t—l. Alternatively, the firm may have to set its capital stock before
fuel costs or wage rates prevailing at time t are known. The exact source
of the uncertainty Is not crucial to the analysis. It is important only
that the firm's stream of operating cash flows is uncertain.
8. The value—maximization assumption does mask an important underlying
assumption. Conflicts of interest between both the firm's managers and
its securityholders and between bondholders and shareholders are assumed
to have been resolved. Although such conflicts may play a role In
utility financing and investment decisions, this assumption allows the
analysis to focus on conflicts between the firm, taken as a whole, and
consumers and regulators.
9. The form of (3) is intended to be general, although a specific example
may render it more familiar. In the Modigliani—Miller (1963), tax—
adjusted valuation framework, for instance, if expected operating cash
flows are constant at the level C from t =1to ,debtoutstanding




Other, perhaps more complex, valuation expressions would also, however,
be consistent with (3).10. Jarrell (1978) presents a formal model in which regulators maximize
political support. An analogous model could be formulated here in which
the regulators minimize political disfavor, as indexed by the lobbying
pressures from firms and consumers.
11. An example of such behavior is provided by the Averch—Johnson (1962)
model. Although the Averch—Johnson model assumes that the firm sets its
ownprice,subject to a rate—of—return constraint, that model can
nevertheless be interpreted as one ih which the firm biases its
investment decision in order to influence output price as set by the
regulators. See Baron and Taggart (1980) for a discussion of this
interpretation.
12. Joskow (1974), for instance, asserts that consumers will offer little
opposition to utility profits as long as the price of service is not
rising in nominal terms.
13. The framework of Section l.A. could be used to analyze other utility
decisions also, but attention will be focused here on the financing
decision.
14. Time subscripts have been omitted from C, R, i and l and these
variables should thus be interpreted as vectors. C, for example, is the
vector of cash flows from t=0to t=
15.See Ross (1977) for a discussion of such signalling considerations.
16. See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a discussion of these agency costs. A
good case in point is the underinvestment problem described by Myers
(1977).
17. See, for example, Sherman (1977).
18. Expression (6) can also be modified to include both common and preferred
equity, E and E. If e and e are the respective allowed returns (ewill typically be taken as an imbedded cost), (6) becomes
"Q—Ot)(l—T)
=i(l—T)D+ + eEt.
If > i(l—T), then, output price can also be increased by substituting
preferred stock for debt.
19. A model of this type of price—influence effect is analyzed in Taggart (1981).
20. The firm's financing decisions may also indirectly affect the
first—order condition for the firm's own lobbying efforts.
For example, lobbying efforts by the firm may be less productive at the
margin the closer Is the output price to the monopoly level. A
successful effort to raise price through financing decisions, then, may
decrease the marginal productivity of lobbying efforts.
21. In a related line of reasoning, Litzenberger and SosIn (1979) argue that
regulators themselves induce utilities to issue more debt than they
otherwise might. This increases the tax saving from debt, which can be
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, but also imposes
additional financial distress costs on society. There are no offsetting
societal benefits, moreover, since the additional tax saving by the firm
in effect helps to subsidize local consumers at the expense of taxpayers
generally.
22. The amount of debt that is optimal may depend on the stability of the
cash flow stream, for example, If the probability of incurring financial
distress costs is an important consideration. Alternatively, as DeAngelo
and Nasulis (1980) have argued, unstable cash flows may increase the
chance that some of the firm's tax shields will not be fully used and
this will reduce the value of the tax saving from debt.
23. The underlying data for Figure 1 were taken from two sources. From 1902to 1937, data on privately—owned electric utilities were publishedevery
five years by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in Census of Electrical
Industries, Central Electric Light and Power Stations. In 1937 the
Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
began publishing the annual Statistics of Privately Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States. The comparison figures for all US.
Corporations in Figure 2 are from the Internal Revenue Service's
Statistics of Income. All data are measured at book value. For some
purposes, market value measures would be superior, but these are not
readily available for the utility industry as a whole. Comparisons of
financing ratios measured at estimated market value with those measured
at book value for U.S. Corporations as a whole are made in Taggart
(1981b). These comparisons suggest that, although there is more
variation in the market value series, the two series exhibit broadly
-similartrends, particularly in the post—World War II period.
24. Between 1901 and 1912, for example, long—term debt issues accounted for
23 pecent of total corporate sources of funds. During the period 1913—
22, however, this proportion fell to 12 percent. See Goldsmith (1958).
25. A good capsule review of the early history of electric utility regulation
may be found in Jarrell (1978). See also Glaeser (1927) and Troxel
(1947) for further details.
26. Similar specifications, in which firms adjust their sources of funds to
target levels have generally proved useful in describing financial
behavior. See Taggart (1977), for example.
27. Following the convention of Stigler and Friedland (1962), it is assumed
that effective commission regulation began three years after the
commission was established by law In that state. Dates on which thevarious state commissions were established are available in Stigler and
Friedland.
28. See Jarrell (1979) for evidence that reported capitalizations of
utilities in regulated states exceeded levels that could be attributed to
their real capital stocks. See also Thompson (1932) for a somewhat more
lurid rendition of the same theme. The consolidation occurring in the
industry during this period provides one possible explanation for these
overcapitalizations. One utility may have bought out another at a price
reflecting a substantial "goodwill" value and then capitalized this
goodwill in the form of securities issues. It might then hope to realize
the goodwill over time by asking the commission for high enough prices to
service the securities.
29. Firms themselves, of course, can also follow adaptive strategies to try
to ward off pressure from consumers. It became quite common in the
1920's, for example, for utilities to try to sell special classes of
preferred stock directly to their customers. Apart from economizing on
issue costs, one of the motivations for this practice was presumably to
minimize consumer pressure for rate reductions by giving them an
ownership stake in the firm. See Clemens (1950), Chapter 5.
30. See Troxel (1947), Chapter 7, and Glaeser (1957), Chapter 7.
31. See Glaeser (1957), Chapter 7.
32. Troxel (1947), p. 160. The Securities and Exchange Commission also began
exercising similar controls over utility holding companies under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
33. Although Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that these measures economize
on monitoring activities that would otherwise be undertaken bybondholders, then, their real purpose may be to protect consumers from
price—influence financing strategies by the utilities.
34. These changes in the economic environment and their Influence on the
financing behavior of corporations generally, are discussed in Gordon and
MalkIel (1981).
35. See Nichols and Welch(1964). Articles also appeared during this period
exhorting regulators to worry less about excessive debt, as they had done
in reaction to the previous periods, and pay more attention to the cost—
saving benefits of debt. See Cook and Cohn (1959).
36. This Interpretation has been stressed by Gordon (1967), Robichek (1978)
and Litzenberger and Sosin (1979).
37. See Joskow (1974), Table 4.
38. See Navarro (1981) for details of this ranking scheme. The classification
is not exhaustive, as some states are not listed in any of the three
categories.
39. In contrast to the estimation in Section II.B., preferred stock is not
included as debt here.
40. It has been suggested that some utilities were prevented from issuing as
much debt as they wished during this period by coverage ratio
restrictions In their bond indentures. Results similar to those shown in
Table 2 are obtained if the lagged interest coverage ratio is substituted
for the laggged debt—assets ratio.
41. A test for the significance of this change, similar to those conducted in
Section lIB., revealed that this change was not significant.
42. The F —ratiosfor testing whether the coefficients of the regulatory
dummy variables as a group are significant are .414, .799 and 3.99 forthe three periods, respectively. The latter ratio indicates significance
at the 1% level.
43. Some anecdotal evidence can also be mustered in support of this
contention. In a 1979 rate case in North Carolina (one of the "very
favorable" states), Duke Power argued that it did not seek any increase
in its 13.59% allowed return on equity, but rather that it needed higher
prices so that it could actually earn the allowed return. A public
wItness argued that the company had increased itS equity ratio since the
last rate case and that the allowed return to equity should, therefore,
be adjusted downward. This argument, however, was rejected by the
commission. SeePublicUtilities Reports (1979).
44. Laber (1980), for example, rejected the hypothesis that allowed rates of
return were invariant to capital structure proportions. He did, however,
cite anecdotal evidence suggesting that the hypothesis may have been
accurate in at least some states.References
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